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Abstract
The use of Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is be-
coming increasingly popular in many security sys-
tems. To access objects protected by TPM (such
as cryptographic keys), several cryptographic proto-
cols, such as the Object Specific Authorization Pro-
tocol (OSAP), can be used. Given the sensitivity and
the importance of those objects protected by TPM,
the security of this protocol is vital. Formal meth-
ods allow a precise and complete analysis of crypto-
graphic protocols such that their security properties
can be asserted with high assurance. Unfortunately,
formal verification of these protocols are limited, de-
spite the abundance of formal tools that one can use.
In this paper, we demonstrate the use of Coloured
Petri Nets (CPN) - a type of formal technique, to
formally model the OSAP. Using this model, we then
verify the authentication property of this protocol us-
ing the state space analysis technique. The results of
analysis demonstrates that as reported by Chen and
Ryan the authentication property of OSAP can be
violated.
Keywords: Coloured Petri Nets; CPN; CPN/Tools;
security analysis; TPM, OSAP; Trusted Computing
1 Introduction
CPN is a type of formal method introduced
in (Jensen; 1992, 1994, 1997) as a graphical language
to model and analyze systems. The mathematical
foundation of CPN provides well-defined semantics
which facilitates the unambiguous and precise model-
ing of a system and its properties. Yet, the graphical
modeling interface of CPN makes it a user-friendly
and arguably easy to use and understand. CPN mod-
els are also executable and to create these executable
models, specifications must be complete. Through
the process of model creation, execution, and simula-
tion, protocol designers may detect flaws and errors
in the protocol design, and may subsequently improve
the correctness of the protocol.
Most importantly, however, is that CPN as a gen-
eral purpose formal modeling tool can generate the
state space information of the model. This state space
can then be used by standard state space analysis
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techniques (such as computational tree logic - CTL)
to verify various system properties, both standard
properties (such as liveliness and boundedness) and
verifier-defined properties (such as security-related
properties). Formal analysis of a protocol using
CPN can be aided with a tool known as the CPN
Tools (Jensen et al.; 2007). These tools automate
many of the tasks required to model, simulate, and
analyze systems and protocols.
CPN has been widely used (Jensen et al.; 2007) as
a language to model and validate systems like commu-
nication protocols, software and engineering systems.
Practical implementations of using CPN in business
process modeling, manufacturing systems, agent sys-
tem and workflow modeling are available now. A
number of usages of CPN in modeling and analyz-
ing cryptographic protocols are introduced in previ-
ous works section.
The Object Specific Access Protocol (OSAP) is a
cryptographic protocol defined as part of the trusted
computing (TC) platforms. This protocol governs
how one can access the Trusted Platform Module
(TPM)’s protected objects (such as cryptographic
keys). Given the importance and sensitive of objects
protected by TPM, it is important that we analyze it
precisely such that we can be confident of its security.
As Trusted computing (TC) platforms are expected
to be an important component of a secure computing
paradigm, any breach in the OSAP protocol will have
a major impact on the TC platforms in general.
The use of formal methods to assert, with high
assurance, the security of cryptographic protocols
has been an active research area in the last few
decades. Through formal analysis, errors in famous
protocols like the Needham-Schroeder Public Key
(NSPK) (Lowe; 1995), have been found 17 years af-
ter it was introduced. This has made the use of au-
tomated tools for protocol verification more evident.
Such an analysis is normally aided with formal tools,
including AVISPA (Vigano`; 2006), CASPER (Lowe;
2002), ProVerif (Blanchet; 2001), Hermes (Bozga
et al.; 2003), NRL protocol analyzer (Meadows; 1996),
Isabelle (Paulson; 1994), PRISM (Kwiatkowska et al.;
2004), Athena (Song; 1999), Securify (Cortier; 2003)
and Scyther (Cremers; 2008) to verify security prop-
erties.
Unfortunately, formal analysis of TPM-related
protocols, such as the OSAP, is limited. As more
methods, approaches and tools are used to analyze
TPM protocols, the more confidence one can gain re-
garding the security, the reliability, and trustworthi-
ness of these protocols.
The main contribution of this paper is the demon-
stration of the applicability of Coloured Petri Nets (a
type of formal methods) in the modeling and verifica-
tion of a representative TPM protocols, namely the
OSAP protocol.
In this paper, the hierarchical approach of CPN
is used to model one session of the OSAP. From this
model, a state space is generated and is then used
to analyze the authentication property of OSAP. In
particular, a number of states representing the viola-
tion of the authentication property are first defined.
Then, state space analysis and CTL logics are used to
verify whether the violation conditions defined earlier
can occur in the state space. Our formal verification
of OSAP arrives at the same conclusion as reported
by Chen and Ryan (Chen and Ryan; 2009): that the
authentication property of OSAP can be violated.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 in-
troduces the OSAP protocol, the concept of CPN
modeling, state space analysis and ASK-CTL (a di-
alect of CTL supported by CPN Tools). The model-
ing of the OSAP using CPN Tools is then described
in Section 3. Section 4 shows how the authentica-
tion property of OSAP is defined and how ASK-CTL
verifies the satisfaction of this property. Section 5
discusses related work, followed by the conclusion in
Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
This section discusses trusted computing, authoriza-
tion protocols of TPM, CPN modeling, state space
analysis and ASK-CTL. Trusted Computing (TC)
is a new technology that is used in security systems.
Trusted computing is defined by Trusted Computing
Group (TCG) as a computer system for which an en-
tity inside the system is responsible for supervision of
system behavior to be the same as what is predicted
for it (TCG; 2007). One of the main creations of
TCG’s efforts is the Trusted Platform Module(TPM)
chip which is to be used for system supervision. TPM
chip adds “roots of trust” (TCG; 2007) into computer
platform to establish a chain of trust.
Access to roots of trust is governed by the use of
authorization protocols. They provide access to the
TPM secrets. These protocols are one of the funda-
mental protocols of trusted computing that are used
before other protocols, to check whether the user pro-
cess is eligible to have access to the TPM secrets or
not. These protocols are illustrated in more detail in
next section.
2.1 Authorization protocols
Authorization protocols or TPM command validation
protocols are one of the most important categories of
protocols defined by TCG. TCG enforces all com-
mands to the TPM that affect security, privacy or
reveal platform secrets to be authorized. Authoriza-
tion is based on a secret provided by the caller as a
part of the command.
It is possible that different authorization sessions
connect to one TPM. For each session a unique ses-
sion identifier, unique nonce for each end point, a hash
digest for messages which have been sent or received
and an ephemeral secret, used to tie message exclu-
sively to a specific object or to encrypt message traffic
if necessary, will be allocated.
These sessions are established to provide autho-
rized access to the TPM. Any entity which decides
to participate in an authorization session must pro-
vide a pass-phrase which is used to authorize and au-
thenticate it. The pass-phrase, authorization secret
or Attestation Identity Key (AIK) is a 160-bit value
which is ideally random and non-guessable. The size
of this secret is the same as the size of a SHA-1 opera-
tion result. After hashing secrets, salts and any other
values, the result will be a fixed sized value, called au-
thorization data (authData) (Chen and Ryan; 2009).
Authorization data can be associated with any
TPM object, TPM command, TPM command inter-
face or TPM itself. An authorized session between
the caller and TPM before creating the new auth-
Data is created. Authorization protocols have been
designed in a manner that never relies on the secu-
rity properties of communication protocols. When
TPM is communicating with other user processes it
always assumes they are un-trusted in relation to it-
self (TCG; 2007). There are different authorization
protocols. In the next section OSAP which is used in
this research is illustrated.
Object-Specific Authorization Protocol
(OSAP)
OSAP is a challenge and response protocol used by
the TPM object caller to demonstrate its knowl-
edge of authorization data. This protocol is used
to provide access to just one type of TPM ob-
ject. A sample usage of this protocol that asks
TPM to create a key is illustrated in (Chen
and Ryan; 2009). Figure 1 from the same source
demonstrates the protocol sequences. In this fig-
ure a name for each message exchange is considered.
The names of exchanges 1 to 4 are Exchange#1,
Exchange#2, Exchange#3 and Exchange#4 . To
design the CPN model, the processes ‘Process
TPM OSAP’, ‘Process TPM CreateWrapKey mes-
sage’ and ‘Process TPM OSAP response’, ‘Process
TPM CreateWrapKey(...) Response’ are added to
the TPM and user side. The defined operation for
these processes is extracting input parameters and
storing them in designated places for future usage.
1. In the first step, the user process sets up an
OSAP session. The goal of this step is to request
TPM to create a key based on a preloaded key
in the TPM named the parent key. The handle
of the parent key is pkh (parent key handle) and
ad(pkh) is its authorization data. Both pkh and
ad(pkh) are included in the TPM OSAP com-
mand and are sent to the TPM.
2. TPM, after receiving the TPM OSAP command,
generates ne, n
osap
e and assigns a new session au-
thorization handle ah. These new items are sent
to the user as the response.
3. The TPM and user process calculate the shared
secret. Calculation of shared secret is done us-
ing hmac algorithm. The input arguments of the
hmac algorithm are ad(pkh), nosape and n
osap
o .
4. The user process calls the TPM CreateWrapKey
function. The ah, pkh, no and newauth are
sent by this function to the TPM. To protect
newauth, it is XORed with SHA1(S, no).
5. When this command is received, the TPM checks
the HMAC and creates the new key. Then pri-
vate key and new authData are put in an en-
crypted (using s as the key) package. The en-
crypted package and public key are put in key-
blob. The keyblob is returned by the TPM and
is authenticated with an HMAC. The hmac is
created with no and n
′
o nonces and is keyed on
S .
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Figure 1: OSAP sequence diagram
6. The encrypted package is decrypted and auth-
data will be retrieved from it. If the received
authdata is not the same as new created auth-
data by user then the protocol will be termi-
nated. Otherwise protocol will be continued and
ends normally.
This protocol can be modeled using different tools.
The ‘Modeling OSAP using CPN’ section illustrates
the usage of CPN for modeling mentioned steps. The
next section will describe CPN modeling.
2.2 CPN modeling
The CPN models are depicted as graphical draw-
ings composed of places, transitions, arcs and in-
scriptions(written text in the CPN ML programming
language). Places are shown using circles and el-
lipses. Transitions shown by rectangles describe ac-
tions. The transitions and places are connected to
each other using arrows called arcs. For any arc, an
arc inscription can be written in CPN ML language.
Input arc inscriptions are used to define the binding
of tokens from input places to transition. The output
arc inscriptions are used to define tokens that will be
put into the output place of a transition. A place
can have zero or more tokens of the colour set of the
place. For each of these tokens a data value from a
given type has been considered. The data value of
each token is called the token colour . The set of all
the tokens that can exist in a place is defined as its
colour set . The colour set of each place is written
below the place using an inscription. The value of
each variable specifies its binding . The number of
tokens and their colours in all the individual places
specifies the marking of the CPN model. The number
of tokens in just one place and their colours specify
the marking of that place. Most of the times next to
each place another inscription except its colour set is
written that determines the initial marking of place.
For each transition, a pair consisting of transition
and binding of all the variables of transition is called
the binding elements. It is possible to consider spe-
cial inscriptions named guards for transitions. These
inscriptions are boolean expressions that when they
are evaluated to true the transition can be enabled.
Otherwise even if all the input tokens are provided
the transition can not be enabled.
Tokens do not move between pages of the CPN
model, rather, pages are connected through special
places which are marked as either an input, an output,
or an input/output socket. The place that consti-
tutes the interface through which one page exchanges
tokens with the others is an input/output port . The
input sockets are the input places of substitution tran-
sitions, while their output places are output socket .
The other method of moving tokens between differ-
ent pages is fusion set . Fusion sets glue a number of
places in one or more CPN pages together. They all
create a compound place across the model.
A sample CPN model is shown in Figure 2. In this
model the defined colour set for Sender and Receiver
is STRING . This colour set like a variable in pro-
gramming languages allows tokens with the type of
STRING to be stored. The initial marking of place
Sender is 1`“ONE” ++ 1`“SAMPLE”. Variable vs
with string colour set is used to move the token be-
tween place and transition. This place is connected
to transition ‘Send Packet’ . This transition when
guard, [vs=“ONE”] is evaluated to TRUE and re-
quired input tokens are provided by input places, can
be enabled. In the model of Figure 2, for the first
token, [vs=“test”] guard is TRUE and ‘Send Packet’
is enabled. When this transition is enabled its border
becomes thicker than when it is disabled. In the next
step the token is moved to the ‘Receiver’ place. For
the second token of place Sender, because the guard
[vs=“ONE”] is evaluated to FALSE, the Send tran-
sition will not be enabled and this token remains in
its place. The final marking of this model is shown in
Figure 3.
vsvs Send
Packet
[vs="ONE"]
Receiver
DATA
Sender
1`"SAMPLE "++
1`"ONE"
DATA
2
1`"ONE"++
1`"SAMPLE "
Figure 2: Sample CPN model and its initial marking
vsvs Send
Packet
[vs="ONE"]
Receiver
DATA
Sender
1`"SAMPLE "++
1`"ONE"
DATA
1
1`"ONE"
1
1`"SAMPLE "
Figure 3: Final marking of sample CPN model
2.3 State Space Analysis
Simulation of a CPN model analyzes a finite number
of executions. This helps validate the model by de-
tecting and finding errors in the CPN model. It can
demonstrate the model is working correctly. How-
ever, it is impossible to guarantee the correctness of
a model with 100% certainty because all the possible
executions are not covered (Jensen et al.; 2007).
A full state space generation (Occurrence Graph-
OG, reachability graph/tree) calculates all possible
executions of the model. It calculates all reachable
markings and binding elements of the CPN model.
The result is represented in a directed graph where
its nodes are a set of reachable markings and the arcs
correspond to the occurring binding elements.
Occurrence sequence describes different occurring
steps and the reached intermediate markings to exe-
cute a CPN model. If a marking via an occurrence
sequence is reachable and it starts from the initial
marking then it is called a reachable marking (Jensen
et al.; 2007).
In most cases after producing all states the
Strongly Connected Component Graph (SCC-graph)
is generated. The SCC-graph nodes are subgraphs
called Strongly Connected Components(SCC). Dis-
joint division of the nodes in the state space creates
the SCC. This division is in a manner that two state
space nodes are in the same SCC if and only if they
are mutually reachable. This means that a path exists
in the state space from the first node to the second
node and vice versa. The structure of the SCC-graph
can provide information about the behavior of the
model (Jensen et al.; 2007).
State space analysis or model checking is mainly
used for model based verification of concurrent sys-
tems. It is applied successfully in many formal models
as the analysis method. State space explosion is its
main limitation. The CPN models should be designed
carefully to prevent state space explosion. This re-
search uses the CPN/Tools to create and analyze the
model.
2.4 The CPN/Tools ASK-CTL
State spaces analysis tools usually provide a num-
ber of standard properties such as liveliness that can
be evaluated. However, all the required verification
properties are not included in these tools. Temporal
logics like CTL are able to reason about certain facts
based on model’s state (Cheng et al.; 1997). CTL
provides a model of time such that its structure is like
a tree. In this structure the future is not determined
and different paths can occur in the future. Any of
the branches might be an actual path that is realized.
Software applications like model checkers use CTL in
formal verification of hardware or software artifacts.
ASK-CTL is an extension of CTL (Clarke et al.;
1986) temporal logic implemented in CPN/Tools.
This extension takes into account both the state
information and arc information. The ASK-CTL
statement is interpreted over the state space of the
Coloured Petri net model. Then the model checker of
CPN/Tools checks the formula over the state space
and defines whether it is true or false. Complete
information about the ASK-CTL can be studied in
(Christensen and Mortensen; 1996).
This research uses ASK-CTL to verify the authen-
tication property of the OSAP protocol. Using ASK-
CTL formula to verify the CPN model, will ensure
that all the specific verified properties are valid in a
specific marking of the model. Otherwise, any part
of the criteria of the verified property can be valid in
different markings that other conditions of property
may be incorrect.
3 Modeling OSAP using CPN
To create the CPN model of the OSAP protocol and
verify its authentication property the following steps
are considered:
1. A CPN model for the protocol and intruder is
designed and implemented. This stage consists
of a number of steps including:
(a) Identifying all the participating entities
of the protocol and modeling them in
the CPN modeling tool (for this research
CPN/Tools)
(b) Designing and implementing required
colour sets, variables, ML functions and
CPN pages.
2. Validating the CPN model using simulation to
ensure that the model behaves as specified in the
standard.
3. Calculate the state space
4. Validate the authentication property using ASK-
CTL.
In the first step a CPN model for the OSAP protocol
and intruder is designed and implemented. To design
the CPN model at first three different entities, user,
TPM and intruder are identified. The designed colour
set for the entities are shown in the Appendix A.
To store all the knowledge of intruder a special
database, using csINTDB colour set, is designed. The
detailed information about this DB is illustrated in
3.2 sub-section.
To prevent state space explosion problem csSEQ
colour set is designed. This colour set is used to
write specific guards for transitions. More informa-
tion about this mechanism is provided in 3.1.2 sub-
section. Variables that are used in the CPN model
are shown in the Appendix A.
Modeling an OSAP protocol and verifying its au-
thentication property needs a special intruder model.
This model is illustrated in section 3.3. The CPN
model of intruder in Exchange#1 and Exchange#2 is
similar to intruder in Exchange#3 and Exchange#4 .
Thus in this paper just the first two intruder models
are described.
After illustrating the necessary colour sets and in-
truder model the main page of the CPN model is il-
lustrated in ‘OSAP CPN model’ section. This section
describes how different substitution transitions are
enabled and run. More detailed information about all
the modules, substitution transitions, variables, ML-
functions and other parts of CPN model are available.
CPN model verification using simulation is con-
ducted in CPN/Tools. It is shown that the model is
operating based on its definitions. When the state
space calculation finishes within a reasonable time
we knew that state space explosion has not occurred.
Running the ASK-CTL formula verifies the authenti-
cation property.
3.1 Managing state space
The state space of the CPN model takes a long time to
be created and the model can suffer from state space
explosion problem in the absence of optimization
techniques. To prevent these problems, we include
two techniques to mitigate the state space explosion
problem: model parameterization and sequence-token
mechanism.
3.1.1 Model Parameterization
To prevent the state space explosion problem, we
parameterize the model via two boolean parame-
ters: the vinc int and the vexcl tpms. Assigning a
true/false value to vinc int causes the OSAP model
to include/exclude the intruder model. In the former
case, it represents the original protocol without in-
truder consideration. Assigning a true/false value to
vexcl tpms will cause the model to bypass/include the
TPM in the OSAP session.
These two variables can split the state space SCC
to smaller SCCs. The smaller SCC can be calculated
faster. The state space explosion problem does not
happen during the computation of this model. The
smaller SCC is a subset of complete SCC. Therefore
if any authentication violation condition be found in
it, the whole model SCC contains that violation con-
dition.
3.1.2 Sequence token mechanism
The OSAP CPN model without any optimization
has the problem of state space explosion. When the
number of occurrence graph nodes of state space in-
creases significantly this problem occurs. To pre-
vent this issue the number of occurrence graph states
should be reduced. This reduction can be done by us-
ing other tools that implement more optimized state
space analysis algorithms such as (Westergaard et al.;
2009) or by improving the CPN model to make it
more efficient preventing its useless states to be en-
abled.
In this research the latter approach is chosen to
reduce the number of states and prevent state space
explosion. Al-Azzoni in (Al-Azzoni; 2004) proposes a
token passing mechanism to prevent concurrent runs
of different transitions. To implement this method a
token moves from one transition to the next transi-
tion. This approach in complicated models with var-
ious pages creates difficulties in managing tokens and
connecting arcs, because additional arcs and places
are required to move tokens.
To make this approach more manageable, in our
model, a specific colour set named csSEQ and a spe-
cial fusion set named GF seq, that is accessible by all
pages, is defined. This colour set determines which
CPN page is or will be the active page at any given
time.
The current active page is always stored in the
GF seq fusion set and the CSI place (a place located
in all the model pages) becomes accessible for the
transitions in the page. When the transition fetches
the sequence token from the CSI place it can either
change it to determine the next active page or does
not change it to stay in the current page. For example
in page U2, Figure 4, the current page of the model
is fetched from the GF seq fusion set using the CSI
place and the vseq variable. When the value of vseq
is equal to ‘user2’ the process ‘Process TPM OSAP
Response’ transition can be enabled.
The next page that should be run after the U2
page, based on OSAP session main page, Figure 7, is
U3 . Thus, the ‘Process TPM OSAP Response’ tran-
sition changes the current sequence value to ‘user3’
and stores its token in GF seq fusion set using fusion
place CSO . This approach is followed for all pages.
This method prevents concurrent runs of protocol
in the current model. However, if the analyzed prop-
erty is violated in one session it will be violated in
a number of concurrent sessions. To analyze parallel
sessions this approach can be extended by adding the
identifier of other session(s) transitions to the csSEQ
colour set. Moreover, at the end of running one CPN
page, the CPN model randomly assigns one of the
identifiers of all the pages that can be run in parallel
to the sequence token.
3.2 Intruder’s database
The intruder model contains a database (DB) which
stores all the intruder knowledge. This database is a
location to accumulate all the sent and received mes-
sages through the intruder. It also stores the initial
knowledge of the intruder. The colour set csINTDB
is designed for this purpose.
The initial values of the intruder’s database only
contain those values that are assumed to be publicly
known, which include the parent key handle - pkh and
the corresponding authorization data ad(pkh).1
3.3 Intruder model
The intruder model of OSAP is based on the Dolev-
Yao approach (Yao; 1983). The Dolev-Yao model
considers the intruder as the medium that transfers
messages. It can edit, remove, forward, duplicate and
create new messages. In other words, it acts as a
man in the middle who can modify messages between
the user and the TPM, or it can bypass the TPM
altogether (see Figure 5 and Figure 6 for illustration).
The OSAP intruder can store any sent and re-
ceived message in its database. For each whole mes-
sage, the message and each of its fields are stored in
the database. After that either a whole message is
fetched from database and is sent to TPM or user, or
a new message is created by fetching its fields from the
intruder’s database. When a new message is created,
the retrieved fields from the DB can be created by the
intruder or they can be stored in the DB, as parts of
previous messages, during previous exchanges.
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A more detailed explanation of our intruder model
and our modeling approach is provided in Appendix
B.
3.4 OSAP CPN model
After designing colour sets, variables and required
functions, based on the shown protocol in Figure 1
the main page of the CPN model is designed, Fig-
ure 7. The OSAP protocol is composed of four dif-
ferent exchanges. In any exchange, TPM and the
1This assumption is consistent with the formal model shown
previously in (Chen and Ryan; 2009).
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Figure 4: Page U2 module of the OSAP CPN model
user are either the sender or receiver, whilst the in-
truder acts as both the sender and receiver. The
protocol is started from the user and it finally ends
with the user. To make the model more readable
and to simplify the modeling process, a hierarchical
CPN model is proposed in Figure 7. The first substi-
tution transition of this model is used to create the
TPM OSAP (pkh, nosapo ) message. This message is
sent to the TPM. However, the intruder can inter-
cept this message. The intruder, using the Intruder 1
substitution transition, is able to send the original
or faked message toward TPM or user. If it sends
the message to the TPM, because of the specific for-
mat of the message in Figure 7, it can be received
only by the ‘Process TPM OSAP’ substitution tran-
sition. If the message is sent to the user again, this
new message should be created by intruder. The In-
truder 2 substitution transition is the only transition
that can do this, thus the method of message move-
ment is changed from the Figure 5 approach to the
Figure 6 approach.
When the Figure 5 approach is chosen the mes-
sage is processed by the ‘Process TPM OSAP’ sub-
stitution transition. Then the message Exchange#2
and shared secret S are created by ‘Send TPM OSAP
Response’ and ‘Create Shared Secret TPM’ substi-
tution transitions. The result will be sent toward
user. Intruder 2 is able to intercept the message Ex-
change#2 . It can send the faked message to the user
or TPM again. However, because sending new mes-
sage directly from Intruder 2 to Intruder 3 and then
to the TPM does not affect the analysis of authenti-
cation property no path between Intruder 2 and In-
truder 3 is created.
The ‘Process TPM OSAP Response’ after process-
ing the message, creates the shared secret. Then
TPM CreateWrapKey(...) generates the Exchange#3
and sends it to the TPM. What happens for this
message is the same as Exchange#1 . It is in-
tercepted by Intruder 3 . Then will be forwarded
to either TPM and will be processed by ‘Process
TPM CreateWrapKey message’, or the Intruder 4
and will be replaced by a faked message. In the former
case ‘Send TPM CreateWrapKey Response’ will be
executed as the next step. In the latter case after the
Intruder 4, ‘Process TPM CreateWrapKey(...) Re-
sponse’ is executed and the protocol will be ended.
In Exchange#1 the role of Exclude Intruder 1 and
Include Intruder 1 transitions is to produce planned
configuration for OSAP. When Intruder 1 is ex-
cluded, the Exclude Intruder 1 transition is enabled,
intruder is bypassed and TPM OSAP message moves
from Sent TPM OSAP message 1 to the Received
TPM OSAP message place. Including Intruder 1 in
the model enables Include Intruder 1 transition and
moves the TPM OSAP message toward Intruder 1 .
To implement the required configuration of CPN
model equivalent places and transitions are consid-
ered in Exchange#2, Exchange#3 and Exchange#4 .
At the start of a protocol a token with a colour
set of csSEQ and the colour of user1, is stored in
the place ‘Start Session 1’ . This colour determines
that TPM OSAP(pkh, no osap) is the first substitu-
tion transition that is enabled. This token during the
simulation and analysis moves from one transition to
the other and specifies the sequence of the protocol
run. It is the token that is used to implement se-
quence token mechanism.
4 Verification of the model using state-space
In this research the CPN/Tools state space is used to
evaluate the authentication property of OSAP proto-
col. To evaluate the authentication property a CPN
model is created for OSAP. To validate this model
it is simulated without intruder. The completion of
the model during the simulation with correct results
demonstrates the validity of the model. To verify the
authentication property, we firstly define several for-
mal notations, predicates, and operator that we will
need to use. Then, we formalize a condition (in an
ASK-CTL statement) whose fulfillment will violate
the authentication property of the OSAP protocol.
We then execute the statement to verify if the au-
thentication property can be violated.
The designed CPN model in this research checks
the authentication property of OSAP protocol. To
verify this property the violation conditions are de-
fined, then the CPN model investigates whether they
are fulfilled or not.
A simple way to demonstrate the violation of the
authentication property is by demonstrating the abil-
ity of an intruder to complete the OSAP protocol
successfully (that is, with the user accepting the new
session authorization data at the end of the protocol
without even involving the TPM whatsoever in the
process.
In other words, in our model, the authentication
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Figure 7: main page of OSAP protocol CPN model
property of the OSAP protocol is violated if the
intruder intercepts the message during during Ex-
change#1 and Exchange#3 and does not forward
the message to the TPM; instead, the Intruder 2 and
Intruder 4 modules are executed following the inter-
ception of the messages (from the user) during Ex-
change#1 and Exchange#3 respectively.
We can formalize the authentication violation con-
dition by using the ASK-CTL statement. To do so,
we define the following notations and predicates:
• let M be the set of all reachable marking of the
OSAP CPN model,
• M0 be the initial marking of the OSAP CPN
model,
• [M0〉 be the set of all reachable markings from
M0,
• POSAP SessionReceived TPM OSAP message be a CPN place
with the name of Received TPM OSAP message
on the CPN page called OSAP Session,
• Marking(Mi, POSAP SessionReceived TPM OSAP message) repre-
sents the set of tokens at the CPN place
POSAP SessionReceived TPM OSAP message at a marking Mi
where Mi ∈M0〉,
• MNoOSAPMsg = {Mi|Mi ∈ [M0〉∧
|Marking(Mi, POSAP SessionReceived TPM OSAP message)| ==
∅ be a set of markings representing the situation
whereby no initial OSAP message (that is,
message from user to the TPM in Exchange#1 )
is received by the TPM,
• MNoCreateWrapKeyMsg = {Mi|Mi ∈ [M0〉∧
|Marking(Mi, POSAP SessionTPM CreateWrapKey Received message)|
== ∅ be a set of markings representing the
situation whereby no create wrap key message
(that is, message from user to the TPM in
Exchange#3 ) is received by the TPM, and
• MEndSuccess = {Mi|Mi ∈ [M0〉∧
|Marking(Mi, POSAP SessionEnd Session 1 )| > 0 be a set
of markings representing the situation whereby
the OSAP session was completed and accepted
by the user as successful.
The main ASK-CTL operator we use to formalize
the violation condition of the authentication property
is the EXIST UNTIL(F1,F2) operator (F1 and F2 are
boolean formula). This operator returns true if there
exists a path whereby F1 holds in every marking along
the path from a given marking (e.g. M0) until it
reaches another marking whereby F2 holds.
Having described the above notations, predicates,
and operator, we can now formally assert that the
authentication property of the OSAP protocol is vio-
lated if, from M0, the following ASK-CTL statement
• EXIST UNTIL[(MNoOSAPMsg ∧
MNoCreateWrapKeyMsg),MEndSuccess]
returns true.
Results: we have generated the state space of our
OSAP model and we have executed the above ASK-
CTL statement. Our model shows that the above
ASK-CTL statement is true which means that the
authentication property of the OSAP protocol does
not hold.
5 Previous works
Coloured Petri Nets have been used by (Doyle et al.;
1997) for analyzing cryptographic protocols. They
have modeled each legitimate protocol entity and in-
truder using Petri Net Objects(PNO). Intruder can
do a variety of actions. Ultimate goal of the anal-
ysis is to determine whether protocol can withstand
intruder attacks and actions or not. The large num-
ber of attacks that intruder may pursue makes hand
analysis impossible. The Prolog is used for analy-
sis in this research. This research provides a model
for handset authentication protocol used in CT2 and
CT2Plus wireless communication protocols and ana-
lyzes them.
The Station-to-Station (STS) security protocol is
analyzed in (Aly and Mustafa; 2003) using CPN.
Aly and Mustafa use CPN to model all the protocol
objects and intruder. They deduce describing pro-
tocol entities and its attacker using CPN provides a
solid foundation for protocol analysis. However, other
analysis approaches do not offer these features.
Al-Azzoni in (Al-Azzoni et al.; 2005) has used
a hierarchical CPN model to analyze TMN key ex-
change protocol. The proposed approach at first mod-
els TMN entities. The intruder CPN model is de-
signed and added to the protocol model in the next
step. The Design/CPN tool is used to analyze the
created model. Concept of DB-place is introduced to
simplify representation of the intruder’s knowledge.
This concept is used in this research to design the
DB of intruder. Al-Azzoni uses the application of
the token passing scheme to resolve the problem of
state space explosion that during the simulation in
Design/CPN occurs. This research is based on Al-
Azzoni’s approach. Moreover, a current state token
mechanism is used to determine current page of the
model that should be run using fusion sets. In this
mechanism a guard is added to transitions of a nom-
inated page. This guard enables a transition just
when container page of transition is the active page
of model.
6 Conclusion and Future Works
The goal of this research is to analyze the OSAP pro-
tocol using CPN. The results of the analysis show
that authentication property of this protocol can be
violated. This model is designed based on assump-
tions from (Chen and Ryan; 2009). The analysis can
be completed by different assumptions to study the
protocol in more detail.
The approach used can be applied to other security
properties such as secrecy. Analyzing other proper-
ties would require some refinements in the model to
add the required places, transitions and colour sets.
It is necessary to write new ASK-CTL formulas to
validate results. It is even possible to use CPN for
defining new security properties and analyze them to
investigate new problems. This goal can not be eas-
ily achieved using specific purpose security analysis
tools. However, the process of analyzing the same
property for general purpose tools such as CPN is
more time consuming than specific purpose tools. To
make the modeling time as fast as possible new mod-
ules, libraries and constructs should be added to the
CPN.
The designed intruder model based on Dolev-Yao
approach can be replaced by other models. How-
ever, this replacement needs significant changes. Such
changes would require effort and time. Because the
Dolev-Yao attacker model is a powerful and popular
attacker model used in analyzing protocols, change is
not recommended.
The OSAP protocol is a part of trusted computing
protocols. As mentioned earlier, one of the advan-
tages of using CPN for modeling is its ability to com-
pose different models. This makes CPN a solution for
combining OSAP with other trusted computing pro-
tocols. The combined model can then be analyzed.
The main disadvantage of using CPN in model-
ing is its firm connection with protocol structure. In
the created model, any inconsiderable change in pro-
tocol and its message structure can cause significant
changes in the CPN model. This leads to inevitable
cascaded changes in the CPN model. However, this
firm connection helps designers to be more familiar
with the protocol specifications. Specifications can
be compared with their implementations, to investi-
gate whether they are compliant with each other or
not. The other drawback of using CPN is state space
explosion during state space analysis. Unfortunately,
this issue can not be predicted before ending the pro-
tocol design.
As future work CPN can be used for modeling Ses-
sion Key Authorization Protocol (SKAP), proposed
in (Chen and Ryan; 2009), Digital Rights Manage-
ment (DRM) and other protocols that their specifi-
cation and prospected analyzed security property is
compatible with CPN capabilities.
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01 colset csTERMS = with null | ah | ahi |
no_osap | ne | ne_osap |
ne_osap1 | no | ne1 | ni1 |
pkh_pub | pkhi | keyblob |
keyblobi | ad_pkh_pub |
newauth | authdatai;
02 colset csATTACK = with posattack | negattack;
03 colset csSEQ = with user1 | user2 |
user3 | user4 | user41 | user42 |
user43 | user5 | int1 | int2 | int3 |
int4 | intx3 | tpm1 |tpm2 | tpm3 |
tpm4 | tpm5 | bypass1 |
bypass2 | endses | terminateses;
04 colset csAUTH_HANDLE = subset csTERMS with [ah,ahi];
05 colset csNONCE = subset csTERMS with [no_osap,
ne, ne_osap, no, ne1, ni1];
06 colset csPUBKH = subset csTERMS with
[pkh_i, pkh_pub];
07 colset csPubKey = subset csTERMS with [pub_key];
08 colset csAUTH_DATA = subset csTERMS with
[ad_pkh_pub,newauth,authdatai];
09 colset csOSAP_MSG = product
csPUBKH * csNONCE;
10 colset csOSAP_RESPONSE = product
csAUTH_HANDLE * csNONCE * csNONCE;
11 colset csSHARED_SECRET = product
csAUTH_DATA * csNONCE * csNONCE;
12 colset csKEYBLOB = product
csSHARED_SECRET * csAUTH_DATA;
13 colset csXOR_OUTPUT = product
csSHARED_SECRET * csNONCE *
csAUTH_DATA;
14 colset csHMAC_OUTPUT = product
csSHARED_SECRET * csNONCE * csNONCE;
15 colset csWRAPKEY_INPUT = product
csAUTH_HANDLE * csPUBKH *
csNONCE * csXOR_OUTPUT;
16 colset csWRAPKEY_MSG = product
csWRAPKEY_INPUT * csHMAC_OUTPUT;
17 colset csWRAPKEY_RESPONSE = product
csKEYBLOB * csNONCE *
csHMAC_OUTPUT;
18 colset csINTDB = union
fipkh : csPUBKH +
finonce : csNONCE +
fiah : csAUTH_HANDLE +
fixor_output : csXOR_OUTPUT +
fihmac_output : csHMAC_OUTPUT +
fikeyblob : csKEYBLOB +
fiosap_msg : csOSAP_MSG +
fiosap_res : csOSAP_RESPONSE +
fiwrapkey_msg : csWRAPKEY_MSG +
fiwrapkey_rsp : csWRAPKEY_RESPONSE +
fiwrapkey_input : csWRAPKEY_INPUT +
fiss : csSHARED_SECRET +
fiauthdata : csAUTH_DATA;
Figure 8: List of CPN model colour sets
A Colour Set Definition
The colour sets and variables definition used in the
OSAP model are detailed in Figure 8 and Figure 9 re-
spectively. Understanding these colour sets and vari-
ables is preliminary in learning how Figures 4, 7, 10
and Figure 11 models work. The design method of
CPN models can be used to model and analyze other
protocols.
B Details of the Intruder Model
In the OSAP CPN model, Figure 7, the behavior of
the intruder varies in different exchanges. For the
first exchange the intruder model operation is based
on what was illustrated for Figure 6. In the second
message exchange the intruder’s role is like Figure 5,
but Intruder 2 is not always enabled by the TPM.
Sometimes, when Intruder 1 has bypassed the TPM,
Intruder 2 can start its operation from the transi-
val vinc_int = true;
val vexcl_tpms = true;
var e : UNIT;
var vseq, vseq1, vseq2 : csSEQ;
var tmpstr : STRING;
var vosap_res : csOSAP_RESPONSE;
var vne, vne1, vnonce1,
vnonce2 , vne_osap, vno,
vne_osap1, vno_osap : csNONCE;
var vah : csAUTH_HANDLE;
var vosap_msg : csOSAP_MSG;
var vauthdata, vnewauth : csAUTH_DATA;
var vss: csSHARED_SECRET;
var vxor_output : csXOR_OUTPUT;
var vwrapkey_input,
vwrapkey_output : csWRAPKEY_INPUT;
var vwrapkey_msg : csWRAPKEY_MSG;
var vwrapkey_rsp : csWRAPKEY_RESPONSE;
var vhmac_output, vhmac_user,
vhmac_tpm : csHMAC_OUTPUT;
var vkeyblob : csKEYBLOB;
var vpkh, vpkhu, vkh : csPUBKH;
Figure 9: List of model variables
tion that should create a new message. In the third
sequence, the Intruder 3 acts exactly the same as In-
truder 1 . It can either send a faked message directly
to the TPM or bypass the TPM and ask Intruder 4
to create a faked message and send it to the user.
Intruder 4 accomplishes the same operations of In-
truder 2 for different input message colour sets.
The main goal of the intruder’s CPN model is to
verify the authentication property. When this prop-
erty is violated the intruder can bypass the TPM or it
can fake messages that are sent from TPM to the user.
Because of the first situation (intruder can bypass
the TPM) a connection between Intruder 1 and In-
truder 2 and another connection between Intruder 3
and Intruder 4 is created.
To introduce functionalities of the intruder, the
next two sections illustrate the CPN model of ‘In-
truder 1’ and ‘Intruder 2’ in more detail.
The Intruder 1 functionality
The input token of Intruder 1 (Figure 10, page Int 1
of OSAP CPN model) substitution transition is
stored in the tmp storage place. Then the ‘store mes-
sage parts in DB’ transition stores each of its fields,
pkh and no osap, in the intruder’s database, fipkh and
finonce, fields respectively. This transition is enabled
when the current sequence token, coming from the
CSI place and always stored in GF seq global fusion
set, is equal to int1 . The considered guard for transi-
tion, [vseq=int1], is used to enable the transition. To
prevent this transition from being enabled more than
once, the ‘JO1’ place, holding just one token, is con-
nected to the transition. At the end of this transition
the sequence token is moved to the ‘ST1’ place and
will enable the ‘Store Whole message in DB’ transi-
tion.
The ‘Store Whole message in DB’ transition stores
the token of ‘Sent TPM OSAP’ place in fiosap msg
field of intruder’s database. This token at the start of
the Intruder 1 page was stored in ‘Tmp echg1’ fusion
set. The functionalities of ‘JO2’ and the [vseq=int1]
guard are the same as the equivalent place and guard
for the ‘store message parts in DB’ transition. At the
end of this transition the sequence token will move to
the ‘ST2’ place. At ST2 based on the model con-
figuration the next steps of the model will be de-
termined. If TPM is excluded([vexcl tpm andalso
vinc int] is evaluated to TRUE) then intruder does
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Figure 10: CPN model of Intruder 1 module
not create any message and after bypassing TPM en-
ables Intruder 2 . Including TPM in the model moves
sequence token to the ST2 1 place. At this time three
different transitions can be enabled.
First, the TPM can be bypassed by enabling the
‘Bypass TPM’ transition. This transition moves the
sequence token to the ‘Run intruder 2’ place. This
makes intruder 2 enabled and none of the TPM tran-
sitions in the TPM-related pages will be enabled.
Second, the ‘Forward stored message’ transition
can be enabled. A token from the intruder’s database
is fetched by ‘Intruder DB’ place and then it is stored
in the ‘tmp output TPM OSAP message’ place. This
token after been checked by ‘check attack’ transition
will be sent to the receiver.
Third, the ‘Create new message’ transition can be
enabled. After that all the required tokens are fetched
from the intruder’s database to compose a new mes-
sage. The new token is again checked by the ‘check
attack’ transition and then will be sent to the TPM.
The Intruder 2 functionality
The CPN model of Intruder 2 substitution transi-
tion is shown in figure 11. The name of CPN page
of Intruder 2 in figure 7 is Int 2 . The input token
moves from OSAP Session to the Int 2 page using
‘Sent TPM OSAP Response’ input port. To make
the model simpler the Tmp xch fusion set is created.
This fusion set easily provides access to the OSAP
response message. The ‘Store Whole message in DB’
and ‘Store message parts in DB’ transitions function-
ality is the same as the corresponding transitions in
Int 1 page.
The difference between Intruder 1 and Intruder 2
is in the method of getting the token by ST2 . In In-
truder 1 the stored sequence token in this place only
comes from the previous transition of the Int 1 page.
However, in Intruder 2 this token can come either
from the OSAP Session page or from the ‘Store mes-
sage parts in DB’ transition in page Int 2 . When
the input token of ST2 comes from OSAP session
page the TPM is bypassed by Intruder 1 and then
the Intruder 2 substitution transition is enabled im-
mediately after Intruder 1 . Bypassing TPM means
that there is no OSAP message sent from TPM to
the user. Thus Intruder 2 does not need to store any
message or its parts in the intruder’s database. The
functionality of Intruder 2 starts from the ST2 place.
In this place based on the model configuration if TPM
is excluded from the model an intruder required to-
ken is inserted into the intruder database. Otherwise
the sequence token moves to the ST3 place. In ST3
place either the ‘Forward stored message’ or ‘Create
new message’ substitution transition will be enabled.
Whether the former transition is enabled or the latter,
their operation is the same as the corresponding tran-
sitions in the Int 1 page. The transitions and places
located between ST3 1 to ST3 3 provide the sequen-
tial access of intruder to the finonce field of intruder
database to prevent racing condition deadlock.
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Figure 11: CPN model of Intruder 2
